The Hind Rajab Foundation’s True Origins Revealed

The Hind Rajab Foundation (HRF) was established in Belgium in September 2024 as a legal body dedicated to prosecuting alleged Israeli war crimes in Gaza. Originating from the “pro-Palestinian” March 30 Movement (M30M), the foundation seeks to distinguish its legal agenda from overt political activism. However, HRF’s leadership, funding networks, and methods raise significant concerns.

HRF is led by Dyab Abou Jahjah and Karim Hassoun, both of whom have long-standing associations with Hezbollah-linked networks and a documented history of radical rhetoric, antisemitic statements, and advocacy for groups designated as terrorist organizations.

While HRF formally positions itself as a neutral legal entity, evidence suggests it functions as a vehicle for “lawfare” — the strategic use of courts and international bodies to target Israeli military personnel and delegitimize Israel internationally. The foundation relies heavily on open-source intelligence (OSINT) and social media monitoring to identify Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers. Once profiled, HRF activates a network of sympathetic lawyers worldwide to pursue litigation under universal jurisdiction laws. These legal actions have expanded to dozens of cases across Europe, Latin America, and the U.S., and even target dual American–Israeli nationals.

Financially, HRF’s operations display opaque and concerning characteristics, including overlapping structures with shell companies, personal fundraising channels, and ties to Hezbollah’s historical financing networks. Its messaging and alliances — including support from Hezbollah and Hamas-affiliated outlets — reinforce the perception of HRF as an entity aligned with extremist ecosystems rather than an impartial human rights body.

HRF has initiated a highly publicized criminal complaint with the International Criminal Court (ICC), naming over 1,000 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers for alleged war crimes in Gaza. This legal action leverages the ICC’s authority and universal jurisdiction principles, dramatically escalating HRF’s international profile and operational reach. However, the United States and Israel are not signatories of the Rome Statute and therefore the ICC has no legal jurisdiction over either state or its citizens. The United States also emphasized the ICC’s attempts to violate its national sovereignty and that of its allies in February 2025 when President Trump signed Executive Order (EO) 14203, which imposed sanctions on the body.

With its ICC complaint, HRF is trying to skirt U.S. law and national sovereignty and position the organization in direct opposition to established national policy, raising serious questions about the legality and legitimacy of its campaign.

Therefore, HRF poses risks to American citizens, legal institutions, and international security and legal frameworks.

Background

The Hind Rajab Foundation was established in September 2024, as a legal/administrative branch of the pro-Palestinian activist organization, the March 30 Movement (M30M). M30M was initially founded across the Netherlands, Belgium, and France to pursue legal actions against citizens of these countries who participated in the Gaza conflict and alleged “genocide” as IDF soldiers. Early litigation efforts were uncoordinated, largely undertaken by sympathetic lawyers and supported by anti-Israel organizations such as Justice and Droits sans Frontieres and the Association des Palestiniens de France.

Leading HRF are its controversial founders, M30M Chair Dyab Abou Jahjah, and Arab European League Chairman Karim Hassoun.^[1] Both founders have histories of involvement in anti-Israel activism and structures, which raises serious concerns about the Foundation’s governance and potential extremist ties. Since HRF’s methods rely heavily on open-source intelligence and social media profiles, they leverage content produced by others to identify targets and pursue a wide-reaching legal campaign in courts across the U.S., Europe, and other international jurisdictions, potentially making them a risk to national sovereignty and security.

In March 2024, M30M filed its first lawsuit targeting a French-Israeli IDF soldier, marking its operational debut. Out of these early efforts—and coinciding with a perceived need for greater organizational focus—HRF emerged as a dedicated legal entity, named after a child who died in Gaza, to systematize and expand litigation against Israeli military personnel.

HRF is registered as a non-profit organization under Belgian law with registration number 1013306540. HRF was formally registered as a separate legal entity from M30M, dedicated exclusively to systematic litigation.^[2] It is located at ​Boulevard Louis Mettewie 46, 1080 Brussels, Belgium.^[3]

From the March 30 Movement to the Hind Rajab Foundation

The March 30 Movement (M30M) emerged in late 2023 in Brussels under the leadership of Dyab Abou Jahjah, a controversial Lebanese-Belgian activist.^[4] The movement’s name derives from the March 30, 1976, Land Day protests in Israel by those aligned with the so-called “Palestinian resistance” movement.

Initially conceived as a legal-activist initiative, M30M sought to pursue accountability against Israeli individuals and institutions alleged to have perpetrated crimes in Gaza, framing its mission within the broader discourse of international humanitarian law.^[5] In Abou Jahjah’s own words: “The movement was founded in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France to pursue legal actions against Belgian, Dutch, and French citizens participating in the Gaza genocide by fighting for the Israeli military”.^[6]

Early on, efforts to litigate against IDF officers abroad were largely ad hoc, spearheaded by sympathetic lawyers with little coordination.^[7] M30M largely drew legal support from Rafik Chekkat, a French lawyer claiming to represent the movement in France, and Gilles Devers, an attorney specializing in international law.^[8] In March 2024, M30M, Chekkat, Devers, and two French anti-Israel organizations – Justice and Droits Sans Frontieres (Justice and Rights Without Borders) and the Association des Palestiniens de France (Association of Palestinians in France) —filed their inaugural lawsuit against a French-Israeli IDF soldier.^[9]

Significant Events Surrounding HRF’s Establishment

In Spring 2024, M30M also entered the political sphere by establishing the “Viva Palestina” electoral list for the Brussels Parliament.^[10] With Dyab Abou Jahjah serving as Viva Palestina’s leader,^[11] the party agenda included official recognition of “genocide in Gaza” by the Brussels Parliament; the adoption of an official anti-Israel boycott resolution by Brussels’ federal government; and lobbying against Israel at EU institutions headquartered in Brussels.^[12] According to Belgian press reports, Abou Jahjah’s candidacy was facilitated with the support of Khadija Zamouri, a sitting MP from the Open VLD, the liberal party of Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo—a development that provoked both media scrutiny and political controversy.^[13] The list received only 1,944 votes, failing to send any representative to the national Parliament.^[14] But against this backdrop, in September 2024, emerged the Hind Rajab Foundation.^[15]

The Hind Rajab Foundation emerged only about a month after the outbreak of the Hezbollah–Israel War (August 25, 2024), when Hezbollah launched hundreds of rockets at Israel. Amidst its establishment, the pager incidents targeting Hezbollah members, occurred (September 17, 2024) and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah was assassinated (September 27, 2024).^[16] The timing strongly suggests a correlation between Hezbollah’s reemergence on the warfront and the start of HRF’s activities—an organization seemingly intertwined with Hezbollah through its founder Abou Jahjah.

Strategic Shift

The establishment of HRF appears to also coincide with a strategic shift. While M30M mainly targeted IDF officers with dual Israeli and foreign citizenship, HRF systematically targets all IDF soldiers abroad, with or without dual citizenship. The rationality of this bifurcation appears to serve multiple purposes. HRF can focus exclusively on legal action, while M30M remains an activist and lobbying platform. This functional split allows HRF to present itself as a “neutral” legal entity, insulating litigation from M30M’s overt political activism and enhancing credibility with courts, NGOs, and potential supporters. It also diversifies risk: if one entity faces legal or political challenges, the other can continue operating. This strategy is reminiscent of Hamas and PFLP-affiliated “NGOs” and front groups, which ensure that they have continuation strategy in the event their operations are terminated due to legal or political action.

Potential Cross Funding

M30M seems to depend on donations which are processed through the American company Stripe and have two alternative destinations – either Abou Jahjah’s personal website or the Hind Rajab Foundation – raising questions about governance and transparency.^[17] Although HRF fundraising is also handled via Stripe, it is routed directly to the foundation’s official site.^[18]

Stripe has been at the center of controversy for handling donations to organizations with ties to U.S.-designated terrorist groups. Although the company’s terms of service prohibit use of its platform for promoting violence, terrorism, or hate, it has previously provided financial services to terror-affiliated organizations including the Arizona-based Alliance for Global Justice (AFGJ). AFGJ served as the fiscal sponsor for the U.S.-designated terror organization Samidoun; the Spanish Bizilur Association, which launched the “#StopGazaStarvation” fundraiser for the PFLP-affiliated Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC); and Al Haq Europe.^[19]

The link to HRF’s donation page has been shared by several anti-Israel activists in Europe, the U.S. and Canada, including Adri Nieuwhof, a Dutch psychologist and human rights advocate based in Switzerland who also publishes for the online anti-Israel publication Electronic Intifada and cooperated with the terror-affiliated BDS National Committee (BNC).^[20] Contributions also came from Todd Shepard, a Johns Hopkins University professor who called for the academic boycott of Israel and shares HRF’s stance by retweeting or promoting posts from X accounts such as “Stop Arab Hate” and “Israel Genocide Tracker” that advocate targeting IDF officers abroad.^[21] A subscription to a monthly donation to HRF has been shared also by Dr. Daniel Koffler, a Mayo Clinic oncologist who posted antisemitic content on X.^[22] Donations were also made by Canadian Palestine Solidarity Regina, a UK LGBTQ+ bar called Nelsons Wine Bar, and the Femur Vision Shop.^{[23] [24] [25]}

Considering the funding structure and strategic focus of M30M and HRF, they should be considered as intertwined organizations, rather than two separate entities. M30M’s social media channels also seem to primarily serve to repost content from HRF or Abou Jahjah. M30M’s role is therefore perhaps secondary, as it amplifies HRF.^[26]

This structural divergence—paired with overlapping leadership, messaging, and donations —should raise concerns of financial, legal, and organizational opacity and potential misuse of funds.

HRF Financial Connections to Terror Networks

Although HRF does not disclose its funding information, it seems to be part of Hezbollah’s extensive business networks tied to families and local diaspora connections across Europe, Latin America, and Africa.^[27] These networks are known to support front companies, informal trade, and layered laundering operations.^[28] They launder funds through used car exports, counterfeit goods, and commodity trades, facilitated through relatives or friendly businessmen.^[29]

Ziad Abou Jahjah’s Financial Links to Hezbollah

HRF’s financial infrastructure is primarily linked to Dyab Abou Jahjah’s longstanding involvement with an extensive financial network that has developed over the past three decades. In the early 2000s, Abou Jahjah was linked to the complex financial web of Soafrimex, a Lebanese–Belgian trading company at the center of an international criminal investigation, through his brother, Ziad, who was employed there.^[30]

Founded in Antwerp in the 1990s, Soafrimex traded rice, flour, sugar, and wheat across Africa. However, behind the trade flows were financial practices that quickly attracted the attention of Belgian prosecutors, the United States Department of the Treasury, and global watchdogs.^[31]Soafrimex owner Kassim Tajideen was later designated by the U.S. as an “important financial contributor to Hezbollah.”^[32]

Belgian authorities also accused Soafrimex of laundering over €50 million through under‑invoicing, forged customs paperwork, and a network of shell companies spanning Africa and the Middle East. Amid these probes, Belgian State Security reportedly examined whether any of Soafrimex’s funds had been channeled to support Abou Jahjah’s political activism, namely his Arab European League.^[33] In 2008, Tajideen was arrested in Belgium and later convicted for economic crime charges related to customs fraud, financial irregularities, and even selling potential conflict diamonds through Soafrimex.^[34]

Dyab Abou Jahjah’s Other Businesses and Shell Companies

Dyab Abou Jahjah served as CEO of JANA SARL, a Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) service provider based in Lebanon from January 2009-September 2013.^[35]

Together with HRF co-founder Karim Hassoun, Abou Jahjah also owns the Willebroek-based company Bellezza (Beauty), established in 2020.^[37] Bellezza appears to be a shell company, as no further information can be found about the company. The deed of incorporation states that the company is focused on “real estate, operating catering businesses, organizing conferences” and many other activities.^[38] The opaque structure and broad scope raise red flags consistent with shell company usage.

He is said to co-own a real estate company in Lebanon, called Sales Force, together with Saleem Sleem, a Lebanese lawyer whose firms have been sanctioned by the U.S. for being Hezbollah-affiliated.^[36]

HRF Founders’ Terror Links

HRF’s Legal Team

The Hind Rajab Foundation’s legal network is activated once the Foundation acquires the identity of an IDF soldier abroad. HRF’s legal team is comprised of local attorneys who file lawsuits before local authorities or the International Criminal Court. The lawyers are intentionally already active within the anti-Israel landscape and hold deeply anti-Zionist and even antisemitic beliefs. This casts serious doubts on HRF’s real work and goals and exposes it for what it is: a body dedicated to targeting IDF soldiers.

HRF’s legal team is comprised of the following team members:

HRF Complaints with the ICC and Around the World

In October 2024, HRF filed a major complaint at the International Criminal Court (ICC) naming 1,000 individual IDF soldiers who they claim committed war crimes, including attacks against civilians and other breaches of international humanitarian law. Since HRF submitted a criminal complaint to the ICC prosecutor, rather than filing a civil lawsuit, the start of the case will depend on the ICC prosecutor. The main goal of the lawsuit is not compensation for the alleged “victims”, but international criminal accountability.

Since it filed the complaint with the ICC, HRF has expanded its work into national jurisdictions, making use of universal jurisdiction laws in Belgium, Spain, Austria, Germany, Sweden, Peru, Cyprus, and the Netherlands. Public reporting indicates that by early 2025, HRF had initiated around 27 separate complaints across a dozen countries.

On August 21, 2025, HRF attorney Haroon Raza shared a call urging to sue Safe Reach Solutions (SRS), an American security company which oversees the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation’s (GHF) operations in Gaza.^[100] The initiative is part of a broader class action launched by Arab Organizations for Human Rights in UK aimed at advancing legal actions against individuals and companies affiliated with GHF worldwide.^[101] The fact that Raza shared the call may indicate potential future involvement of HRF in the case.

As of August, HRF claims it has filed one group complaint to the ICC against 1,000 IDF soldiers, allegedly including 12 dual American-Israeli nationals, and at least 20 other individual complaints against IDF soldiers in different countries around the world.^[102]

HRF’s Method: Investigation and Tracking

HRF described itself as a “justice” machine dedicated to pursuing accountability for alleged war crimes committed by the IDF in Gaza. According to Abou Jahjah’s explanations, HRF employs a broad range of investigative techniques rooted in open-source intelligence, collecting publicly available material such as images, videos, soldier testimonies, and forensic data, along with posts shared by IDF personnel on social media platforms.^[103]

The breadth of the profiling activity, together with the systematic nature of the targeting and subsequent legal reporting, indicates that HRF’s research methodology extends well beyond conventional OSINT. The process appears to be markedly more sophisticated, multi-tiered, technologically advanced, and highly coordinated.

In the absence of verifiable data or official disclosures, the present assessment is based on reasoned inferences drawn from the analysis of content published by HRF. It appears that HRF continuously monitors hashtags and geographic locations, likely by matching social media posts to specific times and places where military operations occur, including Gaza City, Jabalia, Nuseirat, and others. This enables HRF to capture and filter relevant posts, from which they can then work backwards to establish the identities of the soldiers publishing them.

It cannot be ruled out that this process is partially or fully automated, with HRF potentially receiving an alert whenever a post with a relevant tag is published. Once a soldier’s identity is established, their social media accounts are placed under ongoing surveillance until they post content featuring a foreign geolocation in the U.S., Europe, or South America.

Using the information and footage HRF collects, collaborating attorneys initiate proceedings before local authorities or, in some cases, the ICC.

During its initial months of activity, HRF relied heavily on material sourced from other anti-Israeli social media accounts engaged in profiling IDF soldiers. However, more recently, HRF has provided significantly fewer credits for its content and now appears to be fully responsible for identifying the profiles of IDF soldiers to be targeted. The photographs and videos which form the basis of its legal actions are taken primarily from Instagram and TikTok.^[104]

HRF’s Sources

Younis Tirawi

A significant number of the videos appearing on HRF’s social media early on, originated from the X account of Younis Tirawi, a so-called independent Palestinian reporter who focuses exclusively on documenting combat operations to track the social media accounts of Israeli soldiers.^[105]

Although it is unclear whether there is an official connection between Tirawi and HRF, they seemingly share the same mission and goal of exposing IDF soldiers.

Tirawi’s reporting also extends beyond social media. He documented the activities of an alleged encrypted sniper team, the “Ghost Unit,” allegedly composed of many dual nationals.

His “revelations” triggered investigations in countries, including South Africa, Belgium, and France.^[106] Tirawi also produced a dossier regarding the so-called “Tel Sultan Massacre” in Rafah, naming military commanders and outlining a chain of orders. That dossier was formally submitted to both the International Committee of the Red Crescent (ICR) and the ICJ’s South African legal team.^[107] Several of Tirawi’s posts have even been cited by the South African legal team in ongoing proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, where South Africa is accusing Israel of committing genocide in Gaza.^[108]

“Zionism Exposed”

Besides Tirawi’s accounts, an additional source HRF depends on is the X account “Zionism Exposed”, which, according to its bio is dedicated to “archiving Israeli war crimes / Everything is sent to the ICC & Hind Rajab Foundation for ongoing legal cases”.^[109]

The posts share Proton Drive links containing thousands of conflict-related videos, backups of Israeli Telegram channels that reveal member identities along with shared photos and footage, backups of Instagram profiles belonging to Palestinian influencers, torrent files directing to Gaza-related material, and zip folders with media from pro-Palestinian social media accounts.^[110]

Significant for HRF’s goals, the profile also shares an archive of geolocation data taken from dedicated Palestinian X profiles, such as AbuLocation or NemoAnno, and from Israeli Telegram channels, such as Omer Moav Telegram.^[111]

Additional sources of HRF’s photographs and videos include Pal Pulse, a digital media outlet dedicated to news coverage, commentary, and analysis centered on Palestine, and One Path Network, an Australian Islamic-oriented media and video production organization.^[112]

HRF Lawsuits with Other Anti-Israel Organizations

PCHR

On August 12, 2025, HRF filed a joint criminal complaint to the ICC with the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR) over the elimination of Hamas operative Anas Al Sharif who also worked as an Al Jazeera journalist.^[113] PCHR is a leading anti-Israel organization which organizes lawfare campaigns and has ties to the U.S.-designated terror organization, the PFLP.^[114] PCHR Founder and Chair Raji Sourani was in the PFLP ranks and was therefore denied a U.S. entry visa in 2012.^[115] On September 4, 2025, the United States Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on PCHR, the Al Mezan Center for Human Rights and Al-Haq because those “entities directly engaged in efforts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute Israeli nationals, without Israel’s consent.”^[116]

GLAN

In July 2025, HRF worked with the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN) to file a complaint against two Israeli soldiers who were then arrested at the Tomorrowland music festival in Boom, Belgium.^[117] GLAN promotes and coordinates anti-Israel “lawfare,” BDS and arms embargo campaigns, and works closely with legal activist networks, particularly PFLP-affiliated Al Haq and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH).^[118] GLAN’s lawyer who worked with HRF is Dearbhla Minogue, an attorney with extensive experience in pro-Palestinian legal advocacy. Minogue has been serving as Executive Committee for at Lawyers for Palestinian Human Rights for 12 years and is a team member at the anti-Israel research agency Forensic Architecture.^[119]

Support from Terror Affiliates

Arabic-language media outlets with clear and documented ties to U.S.-designated terror organizations have provided extensive, favorable coverage of HRF, reinforcing the perception that the organization is closely aligned with terror networks.

Hamed Al Ali, a U.S.-designated Al Qaeda financier, referenced HRF lawsuits, as did Nasser Al Qarni, the son of prominent cleric Awad Al-Qarni, arrested in 2017 for his ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.^[120]

Hezbollah-affiliated media have been particularly active with posting about HRF:

• Al Mayadeen alone published nearly a dozen articles on HRF.
• Al Manar TV amplified warnings about an alleged Israeli investigation into the group.
• Al Nour Radio circulated reports on HRF filings targeting senior IDF officers at the ICC.
• Al Ahed disseminated personal declarations from Abou Jahjah outlining HRF’s objectives.^[121]

Hamas-affiliated outlets and individuals have also promoted HRF:

• Hamas’ Shehab News Agency publicized Abou Jahjah’s complaints regarding Israel’s investigations into HRF.
• Hamas TV channel Al Resalah promoted HRF’s statement accusing a named IDF officer of being involved in the death of Hind Rajab.^[122]
• In October 2024, U.S.-designated Hamas operative in Europe Majed Al-Zeer hosted Dyab Abou Jahjah in an online event titled “A Year of Genocide in Gaza…The Humanitarian, Legal, and Political Consequences in the European Context.”^[123]
• Ramy Abdu, former regional director of the pro-Hamas lobbying group Council of European Palestinian Relations (CEPR), publicly praised HRF after Belgian police briefly detained two IDF soldiers at the Tomorrowland music festival.^[124]
• Prominent Hamas-linked influencers and propagandists, including Khaled Safi and Ahmad Yousef, have also amplified HRF’s activities.^[125]

Additionally, the Madar Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies compiled a detailed survey of Israeli news reporting on HRF, further boosting its visibility in sympathetic circles.^[126]

Overall, this attention, promotion, and endorsement by Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Muslim Brotherhood-linked outlets and individuals project a consistent and troubling image – that the Hind Rajab Foundation is deeply enmeshed in and legitimized by terrorist organizations and their affiliated propaganda arms.

Sanction Pathways and Policy Precedents

Recent legal developments may provide precedent for the imposition of sanctions on the Hind Rajab Foundation.

In July 2025, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced sanctions against UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese for her anti-Israel “lawfare” activities, including accusing Albanese of “spewing unabashed antisemitism, expressing support for terrorism, and open contempt for the United States, Israel, and the West.”^{[127] [128]}

The legal basis for Albanese’s designation was a February 2025 executive order issued by the Trump Administration targeting those who engage in or support ICC prosecutions of U.S. or allied personnel,^[129] signaling that individuals pursuing international legal action against the U.S. or its allies can become targets of Department of the Treasury actions, including sanctions and other penalties.

This development is highly relevant to HRF, as its activities are essentially the same type of “lawfare” – seeking arrests of Israeli and dual American-Israeli individuals through the ICC and foreign courts. Moreover, its leaders have a significantly more egregious track record of supporting and engaging with designated terror groups and terror-affiliated individuals and making antisemitic statements than Albanese, as mentioned extensively above.

Abou Jahjah’s admitted ties to Hezbollah – already designated by the U.S. as a terror organization – could alone suffice for the imposition of sanctions on HRF. But even in the absence of said ties, the Albanese sanctions establish a legal precedent that the U.S. views “lawfare” targeting Israel – one of its greatest allies – as a national security threat. As the U.S. government already sanctioned a UN official, it could easily justify sanctions against HRF’s leaders or the organization on similar grounds.

The Francesca Albanese case thus provides a clear precedent: the U.S. is prepared to use economic sanctions as a tool against those who support terrorism and engage in politically motivated “lawfare.” Given HRF’s overt alignment with Hezbollah and its direct targeting of American and Israeli nationals, one could argue that Washington has ample grounds to sanction HRF and its founders under existing laws.

Conclusion

The Hind Rajab Foundation presents itself as a legal vehicle for pursuing accountability over alleged war crimes in Gaza. However, available evidence demonstrates that HRF functions as part of a broader ideological infrastructure deeply entangled with anti-Israel politics and individuals with terror associations. While HRF attempts to distinguish itself legally from the March 30 Movement which it emerged from, the split appears largely artificial as both entities remain closely intertwined in leadership, funding, and messaging. The separation appears primarily to shield HRF’s litigation efforts from the overtly political nature of M30M, thereby enhancing credibility before international courts and NGOs.

HRF founders Dyab Abou Jahjah and Karim Hassoun have troubling histories of affiliation with Hezbollah-linked networks and radical movements. Abou Jahjah has openly admitted to receiving military training from Hezbollah and has justified terror attacks against Israel, while his brother, Ziad, worked for a company whose owner was designated by the United States Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for facilitating Hezbollah. Meanwhile, Hassoun has long advocated for recognition of Hamas and Hezbollah. Together, they have been linked to questionable financial activities, including shell companies, opaque funding streams, and connections to firms implicated in laundering funds on behalf of Hezbollah. These associations are deeply troubling, as they suggest a financial infrastructure at risk of exploitation by or direct contribution to U.S.-designated terrorist networks.

HRF relies heavily on open-source intelligence gathered through automated monitoring of social media platforms, systematically identifying Israeli soldiers by geolocation, images, and self-posted material. This approach goes beyond conventional OSINT and into coordinated profiling campaigns. Once identities are confirmed, HRF activates a network of sympathetic lawyers abroad to bring lawsuits, thereby weaponizing legal systems against IDF personnel. This practice—commonly referred to as “lawfare”—is politically motivated and undermines the neutrality of legal institutions. The involvement of attorneys with strong anti-Israel and even antisemitic views further discredits HRF’s claim to be a legitimate human rights body.

The Foundation’s activities pose distinct, direct risks to U.S. citizens. At least a dozen identified targets of HRF initiatives are dual American–Israeli nationals. Though their names have not been publicly released, these individuals remain exposed to harassment, litigations abroad, and reputational harm. This situation creates a precedent whereby Americans engaged in lawful military service could become the subject of politically motivated prosecutions in foreign jurisdictions. Furthermore, the fact that HRF has a representative in the United States signals that it may be trying to target Americans who served in the IDF or dual American and Israeli nationals, which is a violation of American law as the United States is not party to the Rome Statute.

Finally, HRF’s public messaging and representation at international forums underscore its ideological nature. Members of its legal team, including American Jake Romm, frequently employ inflammatory rhetoric equating Zionism with Nazism and calling for the destruction of Israel. This openly hostile discourse reveals HRF’s ultimate aim: not the impartial pursuit of justice, but the delegitimization of Israel, the United States, their interests, and the systematic targeting of their defenders worldwide.

Recommendations

Considering the connections Abou Jahjah and Hassoun have to Hezbollah and other designated groups, it may be worth further investigating if there are enough grounds to designate HRF and impose sanctions on them.

There are other clear legal grounds for targeting HRF and its activities through other mechanisms rooted in established American legal doctrines.

1. Investigate HRF and its affiliates under material support provisions (U.S. Code Title 18 §2339A/B). If HRF funds, supports, or coordinates with Hezbollah-linked networks, it may fall under prohibited transactions with designated Foreign Terror Organizations (FTOs). The DOJ and OFAC should scrutinize HRF’s funding structures, including Stripe payment pathways, shell company activities, and any U.S.-based donor streams.

Evaluate HRF, its affiliates, and co-litigants for potential designation and penalties, especially given the February 2025 Executive Order (EO 14203) – which authorizes sanctions against those supporting or facilitating International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutions targeting U.S. or allied (Israeli) persons without the consent of their home country. The EO provides the Department of State and the Treasury with the authority to impose asset freezes, visa restrictions, and other penalties on entities involved in or supporting such “lawfare” activities targeting American or Israeli nationals. Activities by HRF which involve the gathering, profiling, and enabling of foreign legal prosecutions against U.S. citizens, lawful residents, and allied (notably Israeli) nationals, constitute a direct infringement on U.S. national sovereignty.

It may be worth investigating American citizen and HRF U.S. representative Jake Romm for potentially violating EO 14203. Additionally, considering that Romm seems to be operating in the U.S., it may be worth investigating if he needs to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

Invoke domestic American law, specifically the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA, 2002) or supplementary legislation to cover dual national servicemembers. The United States retains exclusive jurisdiction over the conduct of its nationals—especially military personnel and government officials—when such conduct arises from lawful service or governmental authority.

Investigate collaborations and funding flows HRF has with sanctioned and designated entities. Considering the September 2025 U.S. sanctions against the PCHR for its terror affiliations and participation in ICC “lawfare” initiatives—including joint filings with HRF—the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) should further scrutinize collaborations or funding flows involving HRF and sanctioned entities. This linkage creates both a policy and legal pathway for the U.S. to block or penalize HRF’s related support networks.

Implement IRS and DOJ scrutiny of fundraising platforms. U.S.-based companies like Stripe and other intermediaries should be forced to report on donations processed for HRF and M30M, with penalties imposed, if willful negligence allows funds to benefit entities with FTO ties.

Investigate if there are grounds to prosecute HRF under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA, 18 U.S.C. §1030) and under State biometric privacy laws (Illinois BIPA, California CCPA/CPRA, etc.) if HRF’s methods include facial recognition or biometric tracking of residents of those states. HRF’s collection of photos, videos, or geotags by soldiers is not inherently illegal under U.S. privacy laws. However, if HRF obtains data by hacking, surveillance without consent, or deception, they could be in violation of CFAA or other State privacy laws.

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