Turkey’s Influence Campaigns in America Go Unchecked

Key Findings

• The Diyanet Center of America (DCA) is a Turkish religious body based in Maryland with a Turkish government official as its board chairman. This nominally American religious nonprofit has over 20 branches staffed by Ankara-appointed imams who are not accountable to their American congregants but to Turkey. Despite being directed and substantially financed by a foreign government, the DCA has not been ordered to register under FARA —in 2023 Maryland legislature approved $300,000 in nonprofit funds for the network, routing U.S. taxpayer security dollars to a complex under Turkish operational control.
• Leaked emails belonging to Erdoğan’s son-in-law’s revealed that a series of Turkish-American groups and charities – such as the Turkish American National Steering Committee (TASC) – are part of a vehicle explicitly designed to “skirt U.S. laws and hire freelance journalists to collect political intelligence.”
• Of the cluster of Turkish government-aligned nonprofits operating in the United States — including TASC, the Turkish Heritage Organization, the Turkish Coalition of America, MÜSİAD and the Turken Foundation — only the latter registered as a foreign agent under FARA.
• Turkey’s influence apparatus holds significant sway within the broader Muslim Brotherhood network in America, and especially with CAIR (the Council for American-Islamic Relations) – supposedly the largest Muslim advocacy group in the United States.
• U.S. federal prosecutors found that Turkey attempted to covertly buy influence with a sitting U.S. mayor; a separate declassified intelligence assessment confirmed Erdoğan “trying to covertly influence U.S. political candidates.”
• Turkish-Iranian gold trader Reza Zarrab, arrested in 2016, testified in court and directly implicated Erdoğan’s approval of a $20 billion transfer to Iran through a Turkish state bank – the largest Iran sanctions-evasion scheme in U.S. history.
• Turkey runs and funds a media-influence operation called TRT World – a 24-hour English-language online news channel, launched in 2015. Broadcasting from Washington D.C. to over 260 million households, it covers global affairs and emphasizes Turkish foreign policy perspectives and issues important to the Erdoğan government. Although its parent company, TRT, has been registered under FARA since 2020, TRT World continues to broadcast highly critical content against the United States into American smartphones, households, and screens worldwide.

Background

Turkey’s influence operations in the United States cannot be understood apart from the ideology that drives them – that of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Erdoğan’s political career grew from the same ideological soil as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) – the Milli Görüş movement that merged pan-Islamist supremacism with Turkish nationalism. Erdoğan built the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; Justice and Development Party) as a more domestically palatable vehicle to reach the same ends.

Once in power, Erdoğan systematically Islamized Turkish state institutions by introducing religious curriculum into all public high schools, established direct ties with Hamas (the Palestinian branch of the MB) and sheltered 15,000–30,000 Egyptian Brotherhood members and their families in Turkey after the 2013 coup, and hosted Muslim Brotherhood leader Salah Abdulhaq in Istanbul as recently as 2023.^{[1] [2]}

The MB’s global spiritual leader, Yousef al-Qaradawi — who endorsed Hamas attacks, praised Hitler, and declared the Holocaust placed Jews “in their rightful place” — called Erdoğan “the effective caliph of Muslims” in 2014.^[3] Under the AKP, Turkey became the operational headquarters for Brotherhood chapters from Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria, housing U.S.-designated terrorist financiers and al-Qaeda-affiliated ideologues under state security protection. Turkey’s AKP has been considered by some as “the Turkish arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.”^[4]

This foundation is the operating logic behind Turkey’s influence channels. The Diyanet mosque network, TASC proxy apparatus, MB-legacy convergence, multi-front sanctions evasion infrastructure, and transnational repression of American-based dissidents are coordinated expressions of a coherent foreign influence project. The fundamental error in Washington’s treatment of Turkey as a significant Western NATO partner is the failure to recognize what the AKP truly is — an Islamist civilizational project that is using, abusing and subverting the U.S. to achieve its goals.

Turkey’s Diyanet Center of America

Seventeen miles from the White House, in Lanham, Maryland, Turkey operates a $100 million religious complex that functions not as a local mosque, but as an extension of the Turkish state. The Diyanet Center of America is controlled by Ankara’s Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs), staffed by Turkish government employees, and directed by a Turkish Embassy official. Built with Turkish government funding, and unlike typical American mosques governed by congregants, this network projects foreign-state authority into American Muslim communities while exploiting tax-exempt status and security grants meant for domestic institutions.

In 2013, Erdoğan personally laid the cornerstone and inaugurated the complex in April 2016. The head of the DCA, current board chairman Fatih Kanca, also serves as the Social and Religious Affairs Counselor at the Embassy of Turkey in Washington, D.C.

Every imam assigned to DCA’s 20+ branches across the country is appointed by Ankara, not by any local congregation — making DCA clergy Turkish state employees accountable to the Diyanet bureaucracy, not to American congregants. The network has been described as a Turkish government surveillance platform where imams are instructed to identify and report members of Gülen-affiliated congregations to Turkish consular authorities, who relay the intelligence to MIT (Turkey’s national intelligence agency). Freedom House’s Transnational Repression 2025 report documents this pattern and ranks Turkey among the most active practitioners of transnational repression globally and specifically documents its use of consular networks and imam infrastructure in the United States to surveil Gülenist communities. ^[5]

That transnational repression is not a peripheral feature of the DCA network, but a documented function. Because every DCA imam is appointed by and accountable to Ankara, the network functions effectively as a human intelligence collection apparatus inside American Muslim communities where the clergy is accountable to the Turkish state, not to American law.

Turkey has also systematically weaponized Interpol Red Notices to detain diaspora critics abroad. In August 2017, German-Turkish novelist Doğan Akhanlı was arrested in Granada, Spain, after Turkish authorities filed a politically motivated Red Notice. The German government launched a formal diplomatic protest; therefore, Spain released him within days, but the case prompted the European Parliament to formally debate Turkey’s abuse of Interpol mechanisms.

Following the 2016 coup attempt, Turkey filed thousands of Red Notice requests targeting suspected Gülenist opposition members— a mass-filing campaign that Interpol’s own review body, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF), partially reversed after finding that the requests violated Interpol’s prohibition on politically motivated notices.^[6] The ICC has examined “enforced disappearances” carried out by Turkish operatives in Kenya, Cambodia, Albania, Moldova, Mongolia, Switzerland, and further in the U.S. where there was an active effort to forcibly remove Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen from his compound in Pennsylvania.^[7]

An investigation found that Michael Flynn —Trump’s campaign national security adviser who was also simultaneously under a $600,000 contract with a Turkish government-linked firm — met with two senior Turkish officials to discuss Gülen’s rendition for payment. Flynn’s retroactive DOJ FARA filing identified the client as the Turkish government.

Unfortunately, the imam surveillance network, the rendition planning on U.S. soil, and the Interpol abuse still do not trigger legal disclosure requirement under current FARA interpretation.^[8]

A July 2016 WikiLeaks release of about 57,000 emails from Erdoğan’s son-in-law Berat Albayrak, then Turkey’s Energy Minister, documented coordination between AKP inner-circle figures and pro-government media executives to manage diaspora-facing narratives, tracking of Gülen-affiliated individuals and institutions abroad, and discussions about Turkey’s political positioning in Western countries through non-governmental intermediaries — consistent with the surveillance DCA carries out.^[9]

Beyond direct mosque control, the DCA converges deliberately with the MB-legacy network in America, such as its think tank the IIIT (International Institute of Islamic Thought) with which it has a memorandum of understanding.^[10]

Even though there is proof that DCA is under strong influence of and direction from the Turkish government, which also helped to finance much of it, the DCA has not been ordered by the Department of Justice to register under FARA as a foreign government entity. In August 2023, the Maryland legislature even approved approximately $300,000 in DHS Nonprofit Security Grant Program funds for the DCA, routing taxpayer dollars to a mosque network controlled from Ankara.^[11]

Turkish-American Proxies

Turkey’s influence operations run through American nonprofits that translate Ankara’s priorities into domestic pressure without registering as foreign agents. These proxy organizations target elected officials, state government, and diaspora communities through lobbying, fundraising, and media operations—deliberately designed by Erdoğan’s inner circle to operate under the threshold of legal disclosure. By using family members and cutout entities, Turkey pursues political leverage and policy outcomes while maintaining plausible distance from its American proxies.

One example of this U.S.-based influence apparatus is the Turkish American National Steering Committee (TASC).

The TASC was cofounded in 2016, in part by members of Erdoğan’s family; its co-chair Halil Mutlu is Erdoğan’s cousin.^[12] TASC presents itself as a civic nonprofit but was revealed in Erdoğan’s son-in-law’s leaked emails as being part of a network explicitly planned by Erdoğan’s inner circle to “skirt U.S. laws and hire freelance journalists to collect political intelligence”.^[13]

TASC’s documented activities over the past decade include driving “Love Erdoğan” trucks through New York City^[14]; organizing ASC TV as a domestic Turkish-government propaganda broadcaster^[15]; lobbying to have American cities designate July 15 as Turkey’s “Democracy and National Unity Day”^[16]; counterprotesting Armenian genocide commemorations; and receiving a formal Governor’s Citation from the State of Maryland in November 2024 despite its explicit alignment with a foreign government.^[17]

Love Erdoğan Trucks in NYC. Source: duvaR.english

In September 2023, Erdoğan spoke at a TASC event and called on members to “combat Islamophobia.” TASC deputy chair, Israfil Demir, was sentenced to federal prison in 2024 for trafficking counterfeit goods from China, while maintaining active TASC and Erdoğan-government ties as recently as September 2024.^[18]

TASC operates alongside several other related organizations— the Turkish Heritage Organization (THO), Turken Foundation, Turkish Coalition of America, Turkish Cultural Foundation, and MÜSİAD (the U.S. wing of a Turkish charitable organization) —coordinated from Ankara, but only the Turken Foundation is registered as a foreign agent under FARA.^[19]

Turkish Sponsorship of the Muslim Brotherhood in America

Turkish influence in America deliberately converges with the broader Muslim Brotherhood-legacy ecosystem. In 2020, former Turkish counterterrorism official Dr. Ahmet Yayla identified USCMO, CAIR, ICNA, IIIT, MAS, AMP, ISNA, the Zakat Foundation, and Zaytuna College as entities through which Erdoğan’s regime furthers its U.S. influence operations.^{[20] [21]}

Erdoğan’s daughter attended the annual MAS-ICNA convention in 2016 to defend her father and the Turkish consul general in Chicago delivered an Erdoğan message at the 2018 MAS-ICNA conference. But the Muslim Brotherhood-linked organization that seemingly works most closely with Turkey is the Council on American-Islamic Relations.

CAIR is the premier Muslim Brotherhood-legacy organization in America which describes itself as the largest Muslim advocacy group in the United States. Founded in 1994 by leaders of the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), including now CAIR director Nihad Awad, it emerged from the Brotherhood’s “Palestine Committee,” the MB’s domestic group for advancing Hamas’s political and financial agenda in the United States. Federal prosecutors cited CAIR as a component of the Brotherhood’s U.S. network in the Holy Land Foundation proceedings, the largest terrorism-financing trial in U.S. history, and an FBI agent testified at the trial that CAIR functioned as a Hamas front organization. ^[22] In November 2025, Texas Governor Greg Abbott designated CAIR and the Muslim Brotherhood as foreign terrorist organizations under Texas state law.^{[23] [24]} Even without CAIR’s problematic history and affiliations, its deep connection to Turkey and other foreign countries and entities with radical ideologies and goals raises serious questions about one of the largest and most influential Muslim groups in America.

CAIR director Nihad Awad has spoken at pro-Erdoğan rallies organized by the TASC and CAIR reportedly holds events at the Diyanet Center.^[25] Turkish Airlines, whose largest shareholder is the Turkish sovereign wealth fund, Türkiye Wealth Fund (TWF),^[26] also sponsors CAIR events. CAIR figures also appear regularly on Turkey’s state broadcaster TRT World — further demonstrating the institutional convergence between the Turkish state and the largest Muslim Brotherhood-legacy organization in America. ^{[27] [28] [29] [30]}

TRT World’s parent company TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation) has been registered under FARA since 2020, and even though TRT World has a Washington, D.C. studio, it broadcasts content that is highly critical of the United States and its policies into American households. The channel also amplifies Muslim Brotherhood-sympathetic narratives, covers CAIR events, and attacks critics of the Muslim Brotherhood network in America.^[31] TRT World claims distribution in 190 countries, reaching over 260 million homes and potentially 1.2 billion viewers. Its Facebook page has nearly 7 million likes, and its YouTube has about 10.3 million subscribers.^[32]

Another Turkish state-affiliated media platform which promotes anti-American, anti-West and pro-Muslim Brotherhood content as part of Turkey’s influence campaign is Clash Report. Despite having connections to TRT World, Erdogan’s “inner circle,” and Turkish defense contractors, Clash Report still claims to be independent and neutral as it disseminates English-language material to over 1 million people worldwide, including young, impressionable Americans.^[33] And because it claims to “provide accurate and impartial reporting to raise awareness and promote understanding of critical global issues,” Clash Report content is also shared by American and international journalists, politicians, and social media figures.^[34] Clash Report manipulates the narratives of geopolitical issues to suit Turkey’s interests – not those of the U.S., further proving just how dangerous Turkey and its foreign influence operations are.

Political Influence and Judicial Interference

Turkey projects its influence across the United States, operating in Washington D.C. and beyond to secure military benefits and political relief via official channels in addition to its unregistered proxies. Registered lobbyists have represented Ankara and Turkish banks under criminal investigation, and intervened in active prosecutions, all while unregistered entities evade disclosure requirements. Turkish entities exploit American legal gaps – including arguably vague and inconsistent FARA requirements and the option to register under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) – that allow Turkish influence operations to proceed without serious scrutiny.

The Registered Lobbying Shield – Interference in Federal Investigation

What seemingly allows for the FARA registration gap discussed above is a registered lobbying apparatus used to purchase executive-branch access and pursue interference in active federal prosecutions. The following are some significant examples:

• The Halkbank case represents the most documented instance of Turkey’s influence apparatus interfering with American justice. Halkbank — Turkey’s state-owned second-largest public lender — was charged by Southern District New York (SDNY) prosecutors with facilitating approximately $13 billion in gold transfers to Iranian government entities between 2012 and 2013, described as “one of the biggest sanctions-evasion schemes in history.” Ballard Partners, run by President Trump’s Florida fundraiser Brian Ballard, simultaneously held lobbying contracts with the Turkish government and Halkbank while it was under SDNY active criminal investigation. He billed approximately $2 million in Turkey-related work.^[35]
• Former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani and former Attorney General Michael Mukasey appeared on the record before SDNY Judge Richard Berman in April 2017 to acknowledge their intent to seek a White House “diplomatic solution” (i.e. executive interference) to the Zarrab prosecution. In July 2026, an agreement was reached in large part due to Turkey’s involvement in the ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas.^[36] Zarrab was formally sentenced to time previously served; federal prosecutors filed a presentence memorandum that month requesting leniency, citing his “substantial cooperation.”^[37] The DOJ cited “unique and extraordinary national security and foreign policy considerations,” specifically Turkey’s role in brokering the Israel-Hamas ceasefire and Israeli hostage releases based on the Trump administrations DPA (Deferred Prosecution Agreement) requiring a compliance monitor but no admission of wrongdoing or penalty.
• Michael Flynn published an opinion piece in The Hill on Election Day 2016 calling on Washington “to see the world from Turkey’s perspective” without disclosing his $600,000 Turkish government contract or that the client had reviewed the piece before publication. The Hill subsequently added an editor’s note acknowledging both omissions, and Flynn’s retroactive FARA filing identified the client as being Turkey.^[38]
• President Trump publicly acknowledged his “little conflict of interest” – referring to the Trump Tower in Istanbul.^[39] Turkish officials reportedly visited Trump properties 14 times, more than any other foreign country, including attending at least four Turkish government events at the Trump Hotel in Washington.^[40]

Turkey nay be a fellow NATO member state and American ally, but its goals and interests are often at odds with America’s. Its registered lobbyists and politicians purchase access, push political influence in the media and vie for executive interference –sometimes in violation of American law – and its actions remain largely unchecked.

Political Pressure Campaigns

• On February 10, 2026, the House Ways and Means Committee identified six foreign entities funneling $2.65 billion through 501(c)(3) and (c)(4) organizations and although the hearing focused primarily on Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-linked networks, the framework could be directly applicable to Turkey and Qatar as well.^[41]
• After being expelled in 2019 for purchasing Russia’s S-400 missile system, Turkey has continued to pursue readmission to the F-35 program and is pressing for CAATSA sanctions to be lifted.
• At the July 2026 NATO summit in Ankara, President Trump stated “we’re going to be taking the sanctions off” — drawing immediate congressional objection, due to Turkey’s purchase of the S-400s, the illegal occupation of Cyprus, the threats to Greece, and other issues.^[42]
• The Trump administration’s January 2026 Muslim Brotherhood designations — targeting the Lebanese, Egyptian, and Jordanian chapters — acknowledged that it “could impact Washington’s relationships with Qatar and Turkey,” but still only targeted foreign chapters and not the domestic organizations through which Turkey and Qatar project their influence within the United States.^[43]

Conclusion

Turkey’s influence operations inside the United States are expressions of a coherent and coordinated foreign influence project — rooted in an Islamist civilizational ideology and directed from Ankara through four main interconnected channels: a foreign-state mosque network, AKP-aligned political proxy organizations, a deliberate convergence with the MB-legacy ecosystem, and a network of registered lobbyists and politicians who purchase political access.

Each channel exploits the same structural gap: American legal and regulatory frameworks — campaign finance law, nonprofit tax exemptions, foreign-agent designation. The wide gap between Turkey’s documented influence operations and actionable legal response remains the defining unresolved problem. If Turkey’s influence operation remains unchecked, American national security and stability could suffer.

Endnotes

1. Daren Butler, “With More Islamic Schooling, Erdogan Aims to Reshape Turkey,” Reuters, January 25, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-erdogan-education/. ↑
2. Sinan Ciddi and William Doran, “Islamist Turkey: A Base for Muslim Brotherhood Jihadism,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, April 1, 2026, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/04/01/islamist-turkey-a-base-for-muslim-brotherhood-jihadism/. ↑
3. “القرضاوي: جبريل يدعم أردوغان وإسطنبول عاصمة الخلافة! + فيديو,” Al-Alam, accessed July 29, 2026, https://www.alalam.ir/news/1624047/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A–%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88. ↑
4. Ciddi and Doran, “Islamist Turkey.” ↑
5. Freedom House, Transnational Repression: Understanding and Responding to Global Authoritarian Reach, accessed July 29, 2026, https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression. ↑
6. Fair Trials, “No Safe Refuge,” accessed August 2, 2026, https://www.fairtrials.org/articles/publications/no-safe-refuge/. ↑
7. Jonathan Schanzer and Aykan Erdemir, “Trump’s Turkey Problem,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, October 24, 2019, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/10/24/trumps-turkey-problem/. ↑
8. United States v. Flynn, Statement of the Offense, December 1, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download; Aykan Erdemir and Eric S. Edelman, Erdogan’s Hostage Diplomacy: Western Nationals in Turkish Prisons, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, May 31, 2018, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2018/05/31/erdogans-hostage-diplomacy-western-nationals-in-turkish-prisons/; Sinan Ciddi, “Turkey’s Crimes Against Humanity Under ICC Spotlight,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, March 7, 2023, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/03/07/turkeys-crimes-against-humanity-under-icc-spotlight/. ↑
9. InfluenceWatch, “Diyanet Center of America (DCA),” accessed August 2, 2026, https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/diyanet-center-of-america-dca/. ↑
10. International Institute of Islamic Thought, “IIIT and DCA Sign a MoU,” January 25, 2017, https://iiit.org/en/iiit-and-dca-sign-a-mou/ ↑
11. InfluenceWatch, “Diyanet Center of America (DCA),” accessed July 29, 2026, https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/diyanet-center-of-america-dca/. ↑
12. Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu Met with Co-Chairs of Turkish-American National Steering Committee, 9 July 2018,” July 9, 2018, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-cavusoglu-nun-tasc-esbaskanlariyla-gorusmesi_en.en.mfa. ↑
13. Ryan Mauro, “Turkey’s NGO Network in America,” Capital Research Center, September 6, 2023, https://capitalresearch.org/article/turkeys-ngo-network-in-america/. ↑
14. “Truck Displaying ‘Love Erdoğan’ Message Drives Around New York,” Duvar English, accessed July 29, 2026, https://www.duvarenglish.com/truck-displaying-love-erdogan-message-drives-around-new-york-news-56559 ↑
15. Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications, “President Erdoğan: ‘As Turkey, We Believe Our Common Interests with the US Far Outweigh Our Differences in Opinion,’” February 20, 2021, https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/president-erdogan-as-turkey-we-believe-our-common-interests-with-the-us-far-outweigh-our-differences-in-opinion ↑
16. Cahit Oktay and Firdevs Bulut Kartal, “Türkiye’s July 15 Democracy Day Recognized in 2 US Cities,” Anadolu Agency, July 14, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/turkiyes-july-15-democracy-day-recognized-in-2-us-cities/2946093. ↑
17. Turkish American National Steering Committee (@ourtasc), X post, November 26, 2024, accessed July 29, 2026, https://x.com/ourtasc/status/1861516884216357371. ↑
18. U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of New Jersey, “Three New Jersey Men Admit Participating in Conspiracy to Traffic Counterfeit Computer Networking Devices,” U.S. Department of Justice, August 24, 2023, https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/three-new-jersey-men-admit-participating-conspiracy-traffic-counterfeit-computer ↑
19. Ryan Mauro, “Turkey’s NGO Network in America,” Capital Research Center, September 6, 2023, https://capitalresearch.org/article/turkeys-ngo-network-in-america/ ↑
20. “The Muslim Brotherhood: A Case for Designation as a U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization,” The Neuron, March 18, 2026, https://the-neuron.net/research/the-muslim-brotherhood-a-case-for-designation-as-a-u-s-foreign-terrorist-organization/ ↑
21. A .J. Caschetta, review of Erdoğan’s Long Arm in the US: Turkish Influence Operations among American Muslims, by Ahmet S. Yayla, Middle East Quarterly, Middle East Forum, accessed July 29, 2026, https://www.meforum.org/middle-east-quarterly/book-reviews/review-erdogans-long-arm-in-the-us. ↑
22. Congress, “H.R. 4097,” June 24, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr4097/BILLS-119hr4097ih.htm ↑
23. ” Muslim Brotherhood and CAIR to Block Operations in Texas,” February 5, 2026, https://www.dailywire.com/news/texas-sues-muslim-brotherhood-and-cair-to-block-operations-in-texas. ↑
24. Office of the Texas Governor, “Governor Abbott Designates Muslim Brotherhood, CAIR As Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” November 18, 2025, https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-designates-muslim-brotherhood-cair-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations ↑
25. Network Contagion Research Institute and Intelligent Advocacy Network, Foreign Lines of Influence: CAIR Action’s Unlicensed National Political Operation and Indicators of Turkish State Alignment, December 2025, https://networkcontagion.us/reports/foreign-lines-of-influencecair-actions-unlicensed-national-politicaloperation-and-indicators-of-turkishstate-alignment/ ↑
26. Bahattin Gönültaş, “Turkish Sovereign Wealth Fund Gets Airline, Bank Shares,” Anadolu Agency, February 6, 2017, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkish-sovereign-wealth-fund-gets-airline-bank-shares/742189 ↑
27. Investigative Project on Terrorism, “Erdogan Allies Lobbied Congress Against Kurds,” accessed August 2, 2026, https://www.investigativeproject.org/7365/erdogan-allies-lobbied-congress-against-kurds ↑
28. “Turkey Showed Secularism, Democracy, Islam Coexists: Sümeyye Erdoğan Bayraktar,” Hürriyet Daily News, accessed August 2, 2026, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-showed-secularism-democracy-islam-coexists-sumeyye-erdogan-bayraktar-107822 ↑
29. Investigative Project on Terrorism, “Erdogan Daughter’s MAS-ICNA Speech Spurs Dissent,” accessed August 2, 2026, https://www.investigativeproject.org/5744/erdogan-daughter-mas-icna-speech-spurs-dissent. ↑
30. Samantha Rose Mandeles and Martha Lee, “MAS-ICNA Hosts Several Islamist and Terrorist Speakers in Chicago,” Middle East Forum, accessed August 2, 2026, https://www.meforum.org/mas-icna-hosts-several-islamist-and-terrorist. ↑
31. “Watchdog Group Report: Islamist Groups Influence US Politics,” Newsmax, December 8, 2025, https://www.newsmax.com/politics/watchdog-ncri-report/2025/12/08/id/1237503; Sam Westrop, “A Guide to Lawful Islamism in the United States,” Middle East Forum, September 15, 2020, https://www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/a-guide-to-american-islamism. ↑
32. TRT World, Where News Inspires Change, presentation PDF, accessed August 5, 2026, https://aib.org.uk/Members/TRT-WORLD-Presentation-0520.pdf; Social Blade, “TRT World’s YouTube Statistics,” accessed August 5, 2026, https://socialblade.com/youtube/handle/trtworld. ↑
33. A NATO Ally’s Information War: Unmasking Turkey’s Global Media Strategy,” May 8, 2026, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/05/08/a-nato-allys-information-war-unmasking-turkeys-global-media-strategy/ ↑
34. A NATO Ally’s Information War: Unmasking Turkey’s Global Media Strategy,” May 8, 2026, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/05/08/a-nato-allys-information-war-unmasking-turkeys-global-media-strategy/ ↑
35. U.S. Department of Justice, FARA Semi-Annual Report Ending December 31, 2017, accessed July 29, 2026, https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/page/file/1085771/dl?inline= ↑
36. “US Credits Gold Trader in Iran Sanctions Case,” Newsmax, July 7, 2026, https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/zarrab-turkey-sanctions/2026/07/07/id/1262026/ ↑
37. Law.com, “Judge Sentences Reza Zarrab to Time Served in Halkbank Sanctions-Busting Saga,” July 14, 2026, https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2026/07/14/judge-sentences-reza-zarrab-to-time-served-in-halkbank-sanctions-busting-saga/ ↑
38. Freedom House, Transnational Repression: Understanding and Responding to Global Authoritarian Reach, accessed July 29, 2026, https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression; United States v. Flynn, Statement of the Offense, December 1, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/file/1015126/download; Aykan Erdemir and Eric S. Edelman, Erdogan’s Hostage Diplomacy: Western Nationals in Turkish Prisons, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, May 31, 2018, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2018/05/31/erdogans-hostage-diplomacy-western-nationals-in-turkish-prisons/; Sinan Ciddi, “Turkey’s Crimes Against Humanity Under ICC Spotlight,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, March 7, 2023, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/03/07/turkeys-crimes-against-humanity-under-icc-spotlight/. ↑
39. “Interview: Steve Bannon Interviews Donald Trump on Breitbart News Daily — December 1, 2015,” Roll Call Factbase, accessed July 29, 2026, https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-interview-steve-bannon-breitbart-december-1-2015/. ↑
40. “Interview: Steve Bannon Interviews Donald Trump on Breitbart News Daily — December 1, 2015,” Roll Call Factbase, accessed July 29, 2026, https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-interview-steve-bannon-breitbart-december-1-2015/. ↑
41. Jackson Richman, “US Sanctions ‘Sham’ Charities Tied to Hamas,” The Epoch Times, March 13, 2026, updated March 15, 2026, https://www.theepochtimes.com/us/us-sanctions-sham-charities-tied-to-hamas-5998532. ↑
42. Dina Titus (@repdinatitus), X post, accessed August 3, 2026, https://x.com/repdinatitus/status/2074524496938065960 ↑
43. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury and State Departments Designate Muslim Brotherhood Branches as Terrorist Organizations,” press release, January 13, 2026, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0357 ↑